Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West | 
enlarge | Authors: William L. Shea, Earl J. Hess Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press Category: Book
List Price: $22.50 Buy New: $18.50 You Save: $4.00 (18%)
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Avg. Customer Rating: 18 reviews Sales Rank: 619971
Media: Paperback Number Of Items: 1 Pages: 432 Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.4 Dimensions (in): 9.2 x 6.1 x 1.3
ISBN: 0807846694 Dewey Decimal Number: 973.731 EAN: 9780807846698 ASIN: 0807846694
Publication Date: September 1, 1997 Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description The 1862 battle of Pea Ridge in northwestern Arkansas was one of the largest Civil War engagements fought on the western frontier, and it dramatically altered the balance of power in the Trans-Mississippi. This study of the battle is based on research in archives from Connecticut to California and includes a pioneering study of the terrain of the sprawling battlefield, as well as an examination of soldiers' personal experiences, the use of Native American troops, and the role of Pea Ridge in regional folklore.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 13 more reviews...
Decent work, but with a typical anti-southern tint August 10, 2008 0 out of 1 found this review helpful
I just finished reading Pea Ridge (called Elkhorn Tavern by Southerners), and was impressed with the treatment of the common soldiers' struggles both in and out of battle. The authors do a good job there. The maps are ok, but could be better (more).
What I find unfavorable (yet again) is the treatment of the South in general. The book is written from the 'all conquering, righteous Union' point-of-view. Take for instance the fact that Missourians fought on both sides. In the book the ones who fought for the North are labeled as "loyal". Are the ones fighting for the South disloyal? No! they were loyal to their state and the Confederacy... While this book seems to be the 'best' coverage of this neglected battle, it still radiates with the current political correctness we all have to endure. Just tell things like they are (or were in 1862). A good book, but could be better.
Clearly written, compelling to read, opens a new page. September 18, 2007 1 out of 1 found this review helpful
This book is a model for clarity in histories of the Civil War. The author describes troop movements and strategic decisions in an accessible manner. The meaning of the Pea Ridge campaign is made clear. In this book, you can follow the battlefield and get a sense of where people were at any given moment.
The South lost the West in this battle; the battle pre-saged many of the tactical innovations of the Civil War. This "sideline" battle is revealed as more important than most realize, an early indication that western battles would yield Union victories.
Shedding light on an overlooked battle July 28, 2007 2 out of 2 found this review helpful
Even among Civil War buffs, Pea Ridge is pretty much a forgotten battle. Shea's book remedies that with clear, readable and moving narrative and keen analysis of the largest Civil War battle fought in Arkansas (and depending on which numbers you believe, the largest fought west of the Mississippi). Even more importantly, the book provides compelling reasons why Pea Ridge should NOT be a forgotten battle. He also spotlights the brilliant performance of Samuel Curtis, perhaps the Union's most underrated general, as well as the less-than-brilliant work of Confederate General Earl Van Dorn, who had all of Jeb Stuart's style but not of his skills.
A battle from obscurity... July 14, 2007 1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Many Civil War buffs, and most casual readers of Civil War history, have more than a parochial understanding of this pivotal battle. When Curtis's northern troops entered NW Arkanasas, during the winter of 1862, they knew they were facing a strong enemy.
Earl Van Dorn, recently promoted to commander of the Army of The West, had assembled a strong army and was anxious for success against Curtis's troops. He believed that he could defeat him and launch an overland campaign, against Union held St. Louis, ensuring his lasting fame. He was unprepared for what he would find with Curtis.
Curtis had entrenched his army, along Little Sugar Creek, which rests south of Pea Ridge Tavern along the Telegraph Rd. As the Rebels were wintering in the Boston Mountains, south of his position, Curtis had little worry about Rebels hitting him from the North. Fortunately, Brig General, Franz Sigel, detached from Curtis's army, and at Bentonville, was defeated, and pushed back to Curtis's position and alerted him of trouble in his rear.
Van Dorn's ingenious plan revolved around splitting his army, to traverse Elk Horn mountain, with troops under Ben McCullough taking the Ford Rd, to the mountain's south side, and his troops, commanded by Sterling Price around the north side. They would meet on the Telegraph Rd, north of Curtis's army and push them into Little Sugar Creek - blocking their means of retreat to Missouri. While conceptually, this plan was sound, in reality, the timing proved difficult and Union troops under Osterhaus and Jefferson C Davis, caught McCollough's rebels in the open. Battle followed in, and around Leetown. While the rebels were able to open the battle, their organization fell apart after brigadier generals Ben McCullough and McIntosh were killed on the field. Command of this sector fell to the next general in line, Albert Pike. Pike was leading the Civil War's first brigade of Indians, and was not up to the task. The union forces pushed them NE towards Elkhorn tavern.
Meanwhile, east of Leetown, Van Dorn's main body, unleashed a spectacular attack against Curtis's Union forces at Elkhorn Tavern. The rebels pushed Curtis's troops 1/2 mile south, along the Telegraph Rd. Even with the routing of the portion of his army, now being led by Pike, Van Dorn slept that night, confident that his troops would push Curtis's army into the Little Sugar Creek. This was the mistake that lost him the battle.
The next morning, after assembling his new battle line, Curtis's opened the day with the largest artillery barrage of the Civil War (up to that point). This artillery barrage caught Van Dorn's confederates unprepared. In the excitement of the previous day's victory, Van Dorn had not called up his supply train. Essentially, caught up against the east edge of Elkhorn Mountain, and in the open south of Elkhorn Tavern, Van Dorn's troops had almost no artillery ammunition, and very little ammunition for his infantry. Van Dorn was forced to retreat, east along Huntsville Rd.
Over the coming months, Curtis would pursue Van Dorn's army across north, and north central Arkansas. His victory would assure the Union, that Missouri would stay in the Union.
This book was extremely well written and easy to read. Shea did a remarkable job putting his text into easily visualized format. I was even more impressed with this book after visiting the battlefield, and using his maps, and pictures, to explore the battlefield (if you are interested in viewing my pictures of the Pea Ridge battle field, please email me at michael.noirot@gmail.com).
I highly recommend this book to all Civil War buffs. It will put the battles, west of the Mississippi, into proper perspective.
Michael Noirot Saint Louis, Missouri
The Gettysburg of the West March 16, 2007 3 out of 3 found this review helpful
Authors William Shea and Earl Hess tell the story of the campaign and battle of Pea Ridge, which is sometimes grandly called the Gettysburg of the West. The Union Army of the Southwest, commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel Curtis numbered fewer than 11,000 soldiers, the same size as a single division in the Army of the Potomac at that time. Yet, while the vast legions of Army of the Potomac hovered uncertainly near Washington DC in February 1862, Curtis launched a winter campaign that took his small army clear across the Ozark Plateau and into northwestern Arkansas.
There, Union soldiers from Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Iowa and loyal Missouri met an equally tough set of Confederates from Texas, Arkansas and Missouri. It was one of the few times in the Civil War that the Northern soldiers were outnumbered. But in the subsequent battle of Pea Ridge in early March 1862, the 16,000-man Confederate Army of the West went down to defeat.
According to the authors, bad luck, uninspired leadership and Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn's many outrageous blunders negated the Southern army's numerical advantage. On the Northern side, Curtis and three of his four division commanders maneuvered their soldiers with skill. Even Curtis' erratic second-in-command, Brig. Gen. Franz Sigel supervised a decisive artillery bombardment on the second day of the battle. Three Yankee brigade commanders showed courage and initiative, but at least one unit commander had a yellow streak.
The book devotes a chapter and a map to the preliminary operation in which the Confederates missed capturing a Union detachment that Sigel had carelessly exposed. The March 7 fights at Leetown and Elkhorn, and the March 8 battle at Elkhorn are explained in detail with maps. The Army of the Southwest's later march to Helena, Arkansas is sketched out more briefly. A concluding chapter ably critiques the strategy and tactics of both sides. There is an Order of Battle and extensive footnotes.
Compare this book with Shelby Foote's short account of Pea Ridge in his splendid "The Civil War -- A Narrative." Foote was a great historian, but it sounds like a different battle. To take only one example, Foote says Van Dorn's two pronged attack was planned. Yet Shea and Hess note that the attack was improvised after the Confederate flank march fell badly behind schedule. This is typical of the kind of detail that the authors add to the history of this battle.
My only criticism is a lack of information on weaponry. Except for one Illinois unit, it is not clear whether Union infantry and cavalry units carried rifled muskets, smoothbores, carbines or Colt revolving rifles. The Order of Battle contains detailed data about the type of cannons in each artillery battery, but in one case the text contradicts the OB. For the Pea Ridge battle and campaign, this book is a keeper, despite my quibbling about weapons.
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