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Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign (Civil War America) | 
 enlarge | Author: Kent Masterson Brown
Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press
Category: Book
List Price: $34.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  16 reviews
Sales Rank: 359857
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 528
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2
Dimensions (in): 9.4 x 6.1 x 1.7
ISBN: 0807829218
Dewey Decimal Number: 973.7349
EAN: 9780807829219
ASIN: 0807829218
Publication Date: April 4, 2005
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Product Description
In a groundbreaking, comprehensive history of the Army of Northern Virginia's retreat from Gettysburg in July 1863, Kent Masterson Brown draws on previously unused materials to chronicle the massive effort of General Robert E. Lee and his command as they sought to move people, equipment, and scavenged supplies through hostile territory and plan the army's next moves. More than fifty-seven miles of wagon and ambulance trains and tens of thousands of livestock accompanied the army back to Virginia. The movement of supplies and troops over the challenging terrain of mountain passes and in the adverse conditions of driving rain and muddy quagmires is described in depth, as are General George G. Meade's attempts to attack the trains along the South Mountain range and at Hagerstown and Williamsport, Maryland. Lee's deliberate pace, skillful use of terrain, and constant positioning of the army behind defenses so as to invite attack caused Union forces to delay their own movements at critical times. Brown concludes that even though the battle of Gettysburg was a defeat for the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee's successful retreat maintained the balance of power in the eastern theater and left his army with enough forage, stores, and fresh meat to ensure its continued existence as an effective force.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 11 more reviews...
 Great account but miss the major point May 13, 2008
7 out of 8 found this review helpful
I am behind the curve ball here as I write this review after so many good ones have already been written. Like most of the other reviewers, I enjoyed reading this book and learned quite a good deal about this aspect of the Gettysburg campaign that haven't been touched previously. I thought the author wrote well, did his research and gave the Civil War historians all over a great service. The way many of us looked at Lee's retreat and Meade's pursuit have changed forever after we read this book.
But I cannot help but to believed that the author have drawn a wrong conclusion about the campaign. Call me a traditionalist but outside of saving his supply trains and the fruits of his forging, Lee left Pennsylvania with very little else. His army was in tattered, he have forever lost any sort of strategic initiative and he will be on the defensive until the war's end. His successful retreat enabled him to fight on but not to victory. Only because Meade's army was equally damaged as Lee's did he escaped. But Meade's army was rebuilt, reinforced, resupplied and regroup. Lee's army after Gettysburg was the shadow of its former greatness and that too was grinded down. Brown is wronged and rest of us who happened to be "traditionalist" in nature is right, Gettysburg was the last major hurrah of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Never again will Lee threaten the Army of Potomac with devastating defeat of any kind...tactical ones yes but nothing that will change the course of war. Best way to look at this would be this: if in late July of 1863, God came to Lee and gave him a choice between having his army back before Gettysburg in exchange for all the supplies he has taken from Pennsylvania, he would take that exchange in a heartbeat!!! Nothing could replaced what was lost at Gettysburg, not all the cows, horses, wagons and other material that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have to offer could do that.
This book is great piece of work on the subject but the author drew a wrong conclusion. Retreat is an army in defeat, not of victory and no matter how rosy it turned out well for General Lee, he lost something far more important at Gettysburg then anything he could have saved in this retreat. I am bit surprised the many of the reviews written on this book haven't caught on to this yet.
 Gettysburg - The Missing Dimension January 22, 2008
3 out of 3 found this review helpful
Retreat from Gettysburg provides the missing dimension to the campaign. Popular histories of the battle climax with the repulse of Pickett's Charge. The drama of how the Army of Northern Virginia extracted themselves from Pennsylvania intact to fight another day is equally as gripping.
Confederate survivors faced monumental challenges in their return to Virginia. Not only did the able bodied soldiers face enemy pursuit, but the retreating columns did so with the added burdens of their baggage, their wounded, captured Union men and wagon trains of captured materials.
Brown presents his detailed narrative in such a way as to keep readers in suspense until the last man safely crosses the Potomac. The heroic action rivals any that took place at Gettysburg and is supported by thorough research.
The scores of popular histories I have read about the battle usually end with "Lee did his best, got beat and went home" type epilogues. There was so much more to the story. Readers will marvel why the subject has not received such scholarly treatment until now. Retreat from Gettysburg will stand as a landmark work.
Great book on the aftermath of Gettysgurg June 7, 2007
4 out of 4 found this review helpful
This book has far more detail on the events of Lee's retreat and Meade's pursuit after the Gettysburg battle than any other book I have read. It gives a lot of reasons why Meade was not able to quickly pursue and re-engage Lee before Lee crossed the Potomac. There is also a lot of insight into what Lee hoped to accomplish with his invasion of the North, and why Lee considered it worthwhile, even with his defeat at Gettysburg.
Lee's Highest Achievement February 20, 2007
6 out of 6 found this review helpful
Like many of the other reviewers here, I am in awe of the detail here regarding Lee's retreat from Gettysburg. More than any other campaign of Lee's, this movement revealed his true abilities. The most difficult operation for any military organization is retreat. Lee conducted a masterful retreat. Mr. Brown illuminates this in painful detail, right down to the placing of skirmish lines and Lee's minute orders to his commanders.
Unlike some of the other reviewers, I do take exception to the idea of the entire ANV operation in Pennsylvania being a great raid as novel. This has been advanced by several other historians for some time. What is done here in this book, however is to detail just how much it was a foraging raid done on an army scale. He actually lists the CS regimental seizures down to individual horses and curry combs. He then notes Federal messages regarding the clothing, toys, etc found in captured or broken down CS wagons. All of this provides plentiful evidence that the ANV's primary mission was foraging with a major battle being secondary at best.
The maps and illustrations are good, the prose is readable, and though the detail at times can be mind numbing, the book remains a fast read. Mr. Brown has taken a subject covered almost to overkill and written something fresh and thought provoking. As noted above, anyone (like myself) who had been a critic of Meade's for failure to bring Lee to battle on advantage will likely change their mind after reading this evidence. Meade's people were in worse straits than the retreating CS forces due to logistical failures. His cavalry was worn and poorly supplied, it actually can be considered a minor miracle they were as successful as they were in their pursuit. The pursuing Federals had to follow through areas repeatedly stripped of food and supplies by the retreating CS forces. Conversely, the CS forces as they contracted became stronger (relatively) while the Federals became more strung out. Mr. Brown's illustrations of the strength of CS defenses at Falling Waters and Williamsport highlight the correctness of Meade's decision not to attack with his strung out forces before it was too late.
This book does a great service to a largely ignored aspect of the Gettysburg campaign. I do agree that Gettysburg was not the decisive point in the East and also that in a logistical/strategic sense Gettysburg was a victory for the CS. The ANV survived and despite the irreplaceable manpower loss, gained enough materially wise to last until homegrown resources could sustain it further.
This book is well worth the price. It is an eye opener and knocks some traditional historical concepts on their butts. Mr. Brown has done history a great service with this book.
Gettysburg - The Rest of the Story October 6, 2006
14 out of 14 found this review helpful
Most accounts on the Battle of Gettysburg give limited coverage to R.E. Lee's retreat from Gettysburg.. The text notes "The idea for the Pennsylvania campaign arose many months before. It was born in a desperation caused by the looming collapse of the Army of Northern Virginia if it remained in war-ravages central Virginia without adequate food and supplies for its men and fodder for its horses and mules." Consequently, from the moment that Lee reached the Maryland side of the Potomac River the countryside was scoured by Confederate quartermasters and commissaries of subsistence for food, fodder and supply. Interestingly, "The effort to obtain food, fodder, and equipment would never stop; even the three days of battle at Gettysburg did not interfere with it." The author, Kent Masterson Brown, addresses in detail the acute logistical problems attendant to Lee's army's retreat from Gettysburg with the critical supplies that had been foraged.
The text is broadly arranged into three sections: 1st disengagement at Gettysburg and crossing the South Mountain range; 2nd travel to Harrisburg and Williamsport; 3rd defense of Williamsport and Falling Waters, Virginia then travel to Staunton Virginia. "A slow, fighting retreat sounds simple in theory, but it is extraordinarily difficult in practice, particularly with a large army burdened by enormous trains." The trains were more than fifty-seven miles of wagon and ambulance trains plus ten of thousands of livestock. The text gives excellent, brief narratives of Lee's army's travels to the Potomac River, the cavalry attacks on the trains plus the engagements of the rear guard troops as Meade attacked.
Most interesting is Brown's accounts of attending to the sick and wounded. Those that could walk accompanied the trains while other wounded rode in ambulance wagons if available. However, for those seriously ill or wounded or who lacked transportation, surgical teams were ordered to stay with them. For example, of the 1,300 wounded in Johnson's Division, 446 were left behind. Ever effort was made to care for the sick and wounded whether they could travel or had to be left behind. Protecting the trains was exceedingly difficult; the escorts suffered along with the helpless wounded.
The entire army was in Hagerstown by the morning of 7 July. The author notes that"The movement of Lee's army from the morning of 5 July until the afternoon of 6 July was one of the most critical episodes of the retreat from Gettysburg, although it was far from being filled with battle action." "Lee's slow march and bold rear guard on 5 July had a profound effect on Meade and his lieutenants." Next Lee had to set up strong defenses until he could make arrangements for crossing the Potomac River. Using the ferries at Williamsport was exceptionally slow so that Lee's defenses must hold until he could build a pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. By 10 July the Williamsport defense line was almost ready, but Lee had limited time to cross the Potomac. The last person crossed the pontoon bridge on 14 July. The text narrates Meade's attempts to engage Lee and prevent his army from crossing the Potomac. However, the text concludes that "....there was nothing Meade could have done to prevent Lee from winning the race to the Williamsburg defense line or holding it."
Once across the Potomac River, The Shenandoah Valley served as the corridor for Lee's army's evacuation. The problem now was to take care of the sick and wounded and get them to the General and Receiving Hospital at Staunton, Virginia. Staunton was soon overrun with sick and wounded soldiers. The text provides a brief but excellent account of this phase of the retreat.
President Lincoln blamed Lee's escape on Meade's slow response. While Meade undoubtedly could have done better, Brown notes Meade's army "was in a desperate condition, many artillery batteries could not accompany their corps while his horses and mules pulling many of the guns and caissons were so exhausted and weakened by excessive campaigning and lack of forage that they collapsed...." Throughout Lee's retreat, Meade had critical supply problems that limited his response.
The author concludes "Although the battle of Gettysburg was indeed a Confederate loss, the invasion of Pennsylvania may not have been. In fact, Lee successfully brought his army and all its trains across the Potomac River. In the process, he managed to get out of Pennsylvania and Maryland more than forty-five miles of quartermaster and substance trains filled with impressed stores." One can only speculate on how, or if, the Army of Northern Virginia would have survived without these supplies. Lee's very successful retreat maintained the balance of power in his theatre of operations.
This is an excellently researched work; Kent Brown uses much previously untapped source material. This book is the major source of information on the retreat from Gettysburg and will be of interest to all serious students of Civil War History.
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