The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich | 
 enlarge | Author: Ian Kershaw
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Category: Book
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Avg. Customer Rating:  6 reviews
Sales Rank: 264411
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 320
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.6
Dimensions (in): 7.7 x 5.1 x 0.8
ISBN: 0192802062
Dewey Decimal Number: 943
EAN: 9780192802064
ASIN: 0192802062
Publication Date: December 13, 2001
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Amazon.com Review
Before writing the first volume of his substantial biography of Adolf Hitler, Ian Kershaw focused on the popular appeal of the Nazi dictator in The "Hitler Myth". Arguing that "the sources of Hitler's appeal must be sought ... in those who adored him, rather than in the leader himself," Kershaw shows how Hitler's public image welded together antagonistic forces within the Nazi state, mobilized the nation for war, and contributed to the ethos that animated systematic and genocidal violence. Responding to historians who maintain that Hitler's personality or ideological fixations accounted for his broad acceptance, Kershaw argues that, in the early 1930s, a sizable plurality of Germans hungered for an omnipotent Fuehrer to stand above the political disharmonies of the Weimar state. Later, foreign policy and military victories attracted many more to the Hitler legend. However, victories were the price for popularity; and Hitler became more and more bloodthirsty as both his image and regime foundered under the blows of the Allied powers. The Hitler myth, then--a cultural phenomenon the Reich Minister Joseph Goebbels claimed as his greatest propaganda triumph--became a fundamental cause for the collapse of the Nazi State. Kershaw's authoritative history of political culture in Hitler's Germany forcefully demonstrates that the Fuehrer's popularity rested less on "bizarre and arcane precepts of Nazi ideology than on social and political values ... recognizable in many societies other than the Third Reich." In our present political environment, which repeatedly features outcries for "leadership" from pundits and public servants alike, the disturbing lessons of The "Hitler Myth" are an urgent warning. --James Highfill
Product Description
Few, if any, twentieth-century political leaders have enjoyed greater popularity among their own people than Hitler did in the decade or so following his rise to power in 1933. The personality of Hitler himself, however, can scarcely explain this immense popularity or his political effectiveness in the 1930s and '40s. His hold over the German people lay rather in the hopes and perceptions of the millions who adored him.
Based largely on the reports of government officials, party agencies, and political opponents, Ian Kershaw's groundbreaking study charts the creation, growth, and decline of the "Hitler myth." He demonstrates how the manufactured "Fuhrer-cult" served as a crucial integrating force within the Third Reich and a vital element in the attainment of Nazi political aims. Masters of the new techniques of propaganda, the Nazis used "image-building" to exploit the beliefs, phobias, and prejudices of the day. Kershaw greatly enhances our understanding of the German people's attitudes and behavior under Nazi rule and the psychology behind their adulation of Hitler.
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 Rebuts the Allied-Bombing-Ineffective Myth July 19, 2007
12 out of 16 found this review helpful
Ever so often, a new book comes out that purports to show that the Allied bombing of Germany did not contribute to the Allied victory. If anything, we are told, the destruction of cities only stiffened German resistance and made the Germans cling more to Hitler than ever before.
Kershaw examines these contentions and finds them wanting. He says: "The overall conclusion was that bombing did not stiffen morale, but seriously depressed it: fatalism, apathy, defeatism, and other psychological effects were all more strongly encountered among bombed than unbombed sections of the population. And much of the hate and anger aroused by the bombing was channeled against the Nazi regime which was blamed for its failure to ward off the attacks." (p. 207).
Estimates are cited which indicate that a third of the German population suffered directly from Allied bombing, a quarter of all German homes were at least damaged, and that nearly five million Germans had to be evacuated (p. 202). This is in addition to the over-300,000 deaths.
Both the German and the early-postwar Allied sources agree on the demoralizing effect of Allied bombing. For instance, consider the situation soon after the bombing of Schweinfurt: "Already after the first raid in August 1943, SD agencies in Lower Franconia reported widespread shock and depression among the population, even among the previously `reliable' sections who had been convinced of German victory." (p. 203).
Kershaw could have made his case stronger by focusing more on the level of German war production that existed in the face of Allied bombing as compared with the level of German war production that would have existed had the Allied bombings not taken place. One must also remember, from a strictly military point of view, that the lost productivity from the disruptions and dislocations, of urban-industrial infrastructure, caused by area bombing, was usually much greater than the lost productivity caused by the immediate deaths, injuries, and destruction.
A Fundamentally Flawed but still Interesting Work May 19, 2007
5 out of 7 found this review helpful
Historian Ian Kershaw, later to scribe a monumental two-volume biography of Hitler, here tries, in one of his early works on Nazism, to assess the creation, acceptance, and downfall of the "Hitler Myth" among the German people. In essence, the Myth of Hitler is that of a charismatic leader and hero of the people upon whom the people bestow traits, characteristics, and motives that simply do not gibe with the facts.
The Hitler Myth reached its zenith in 1941 at the same time that the Third Reich was becoming the largest empire the world has ever known. Small wonder then that the German people supported Hitler in his ever expanding grabs for land and power. In this respect Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbel's claim that he created the "Hitler Myth" may be a case of the tail wagging the dog.
In any event, author Kershaw makes a marvelous attempt to understand how and why the Hitler Myth started, how it grew and was sustained, and what led to its destruction. In so doing he focuses not on Hitler the person as a myth but on the people who were the real source of the Hitler Myth, the people of Germany who bought into the myth.
The basic resources for his analysis are based on two different, and competing, records. One major resource is internal reports of the government and Nazi Party agencies on the state of the attitudes, feelings, and morale of the German people. The other major resource is reports made by agents within Germany of the Social Democratic Party, initially as a party in opposition and then as a party in exile.
One of the early goals of the Nazi Party after it wrested power from Hindenburg was to coalesce the Nazi Party vision of Hitler as the embodiment of the Nazi movement to Hitler becoming the embodiment of the State and Germany itself. (One reason Hitler eliminated Ernest Roehm in the Night of the Long Knives was that Roehm, with his 2-3 million man private army of Brownshirts (the SA) behind him, was a direct rival to Hitler for the affections of both the Party and the country. E.g., at the 1933 Nuremberg party rally the focus was almost equally on Roehm and Hitler; at the 1934 party rally, held shortly after eliminating Roehm, the focus was solely on Hitler.)
Author Kershaw's work makes an excellent effort at trying to understand the phenomenon whereby Hitler and the State became one and the same in the minds of, apparently, most Germans by 1939-40.
The work, however, is not, and cannot, be definitive because the sources he uses to make his conclusions are first, biased by nature, and two, secondary, not primary. (Assessments of the Nazi Party reports also seem to be heavily based on only one part of the country, Bavaria.) That being said, the results are nonetheless fascinating and well worth reading to anyone interested in trying to gain a better understanding of Hitler, Nazism, or World War II.
 Solid work September 20, 2006
14 out of 16 found this review helpful
Kershaw is probably more famous now for his two part bio of Hitler, but he wrote this book around 1980 and it is still one of the best works on how propaganda painted a picture of the Fuhrer. What one finds out through reading this book is a glmpse into everyday life for Germans, how propaganda kept Hitler's popularity up despite the popularity of the Nazi Party declining, and how propaganda gave the general public a distorted view of Hitler. We also see how the public could have supported someone like Hitler and his party. Often times with the Nazi era, it is hard to understand how ordinary citizens supported the party considering what we know now, but of course people at the time did not expect a world war or the holocaust to happen. Kershaw does an excellent job of hitting this theme as he puts the reader in the time period so we see why Hitler and the Nazis rose to power. We also see that the Nazi's often times downplayed their anti-Semitism before taking power and their hatred of the Jews was not amongst the reasons most ordinary people voted Nazi or supported Hitler. All in all, this book is a must read for anyone interested in the Nazis or the use of propaganda. The book is scholarly, but for the most part is easy to read and flows pretty well.
A solid, interesting survey September 19, 2005
28 out of 33 found this review helpful
"The Hitler Myth" is essentially a charting of the effectiveness of--though not an in-depth investigation of--the propaganda machine relative specifically to how the German populace viewed Adolf Hitler from the late 1920's through the duration of the war. Kershaw measures the propaganda machine's effectiveness through 1) opinion poll results, 2) voting figures, and 3) anecdotal documentation, especially reports from Nazi Party functionaries regarding what might today be called "the word on the street."
What ends up being Kershaw's most strongly stressed observation in the text is the persistence in Nazi Germany of public "excusablility" of Hitler (my clumsy term, not Kershaw's) or a sort of "blame transfer" (again, my inadequate term) that existed relative to any negative news or regime mistakes.
In other words, when things went wrong, the public--in a seemingly maniacal way--held onto a "BUT IT'S NOT THE FURHER'S FAULT" mentality. Concomitant to this reality is the extent to which the Nazi Party was actually actively disliked by huge swaths of the population of Germany from quite early on (pre-war), and even more so by the beginning of hostilities with the Allies. Nonetheless, none of that displeasure seemed to get applied to Hitler himself until much, much later. Kershaw's fairly convincing stream of written evidence shows that the public persistently disassociated Hitler from the over-zealous policies, corruption, or flat-out bad ideas and brutish stupidity of the Nazi regime by assuming that Hitler was being misinformed by sycophants, or was being foiled by the pernicious British, or was simply too absorbed with genius foreign policy and thus distracted from domestic concerns, etc. In fact, the evidence suggests that during many points of the Third Reich's embarrassing reign, at least up until the defeat at Stalingrad, when the popularity of the Nazi Party worsened, Hitler's personal popularity actually increased.
The "why" behind all this is tricky, and Kershaw is honest enough to say so, admitting that he doesn't have a complete answer. But, his exhaustive research over the years has helped. Clearly, he thinks that the Nazi propaganda machine and its persistent application is the principle reason for the amazing success of the "Hitler myth." Or, to put it in modern pundit parlance: "It's the media, stupid." Control of communications by savvy, Machiavellian manipulators like Joseph Gobbles allowed for Hitler to always be positioned (literally, too!) in the best possible light, no matter what the national or international circumstances.
A secondary but important factor in the vitality of the Hitler myth was simply a desperate German thirst for leadership (decisive leadership or at least decisive-sounding) in the wake of 20 years of highly dysfunctional adolescent democracy burdened by rank corruption and destabilized by what was at the time the compelling Communist alternative, Communism having not then been discredited anywhere in the world nearly to the extent it has been now.
While Kershaw does not apply the lessons of the Hitler myth directly to any aspect of today's political environment, some parallels are there, and he discretely suggests as much in a few places in the text. Kershaw wisely leaves it up to you, the reader, to plumb them. I suspect that Kershaw, being a British citizen and longtime observer of the media of the past, cannot help but find some slight comparisons--arguably worrying--between the inability of the German media to respond critically to Hitler and the inability of the modern media to do the same relative to national leaders or powerful and essentially conservative or nationalistic movements, particularly in the United States and in those large regions of the Middle East served by Al-Jezeera's news service. Of course media observers, including some of Kershaw's professional colleagues, outside of the U.S. and some within (where it is considered fairly "politically incorrect") have drawn parallels to the staging of Hitler-focused Nazi propaganda events and rallies and those staged by the current American presidential administration. Parallels have also been drawn--much more often in Kershaw's native Britain than in the U.S.--between the Third Reich's control of the media the corporate control of the media today. (Incidentally, Kershaw does somewhat discuss public partisan events, especially Nazi rallies in small communities and parades in Berlin and elsewhere, and it is interesting to read the obsessively detailed accounts of official Nazi reports citing how many people were in the crowds during parades, what percentage of them seemed to be executing the Nazi salute, and so forth.) Granted, the media's inability to serve genuine public discourse today and be properly critical (I use "critical" in the same sense of the word as it is used in the term "critical thinking;" that is, "critical" meaning the qualities of being careful, objective, and intellectually rigorous, not necessarily "negative") is less severe today that than in Germany in the 1930's and 1940's. But, that begs the question: just how un-critical is uncritical *enough* to cause great harm to a society, nation, or culture, particularly a Western one?
If there is a glaring omission in Kershaw's book, it is that of technological and sociological context relative to media. His entire text is about propaganda, media, and public perception, and yet there is no examination of just how many of the German people read newspaper, how many newspapers there were, how many of the people listened to radio, how many hours, and what radio shows existed, and what the options were. In fact, at times it seems Kershaw was too close to his own material, and failed to realize that the basics of the media landscape of Germany from the 1920's through the 1940's isn't something even erudite readers are likely to understand today. Granted, he touched on points of this landscape: there are brief mentions of posters and their use, or the number of Hitler's speeches and their frequency; there are citations throughout from specific newspapers, including underground anti-Nazi publications (some of which, in retrospect, seem to have been stirringly prescient and clear-sighted, so much so as to make me shake my head at times while reading their predictions and worries about what Hitler would bring to the German people and Europe). But, it was not nearly a coherent enough picture. Even just one or two pages of text giving an overarching view of the German media landscape during the 1920's and 1930's would have been extremely helpful.
interesting preview August 2, 2005
3 out of 12 found this review helpful
AN INTERESTING PREVIEW OF HIS LATER CLASSICS ON THE LIFE OF HITLER HUBRIS AND NEMESIS
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