|
Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda (Random House Large Print (Cloth/Paper)) | 
 enlarge | Author: John Keegan
Publisher: Random House Large Print
Category: Book
List Price: $32.00
Buy Used: $2.79
You Save: $29.21 (91%)
Used (10) from $2.79
Avg. Customer Rating:  46 reviews
Sales Rank: 1186357
Format: Large Print
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 736
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2.4
Dimensions (in): 9.6 x 6.6 x 1.5
ISBN: 0375432248
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.343209034
EAN: 9780375432248
ASIN: 0375432248
Publication Date: November 4, 2003
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Shipping: Expedited shipping available
Shipping: International shipping available
Condition: Exlibrary book with stickers. LARGE PRINT. Nice book. Delivery Confirmation in U.S.A. Sorry unable to ship to prisons.
|
| Also Available In:
|
| Similar Items:
|
| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
In fiction, the spy is a glamorous figure whose secrets make or break peace, but, historically, has intelligence really been a vital step to military victories? In this breakthrough study, the preeminent war historian John Keegan goes to the heart of a series of important conflicts to develop a powerful argument about military intelligence.
In his characteristically wry and perceptive prose, Keegan offers us nothing short of a new history of war through the prism of intelligence. He brings to life the split-second decisions that went into waging war before the benefit of aerial surveillance and electronic communications. The English admiral Horatio Nelson was hot on the heels of Napoleon’s fleet in the Mediterranean and never knew it, while Stonewall Jackson was able to compensate for the Confederacy’s disadvantage in firearms and manpower with detailed maps of the Appalachians. In the past century, espionage and decryption have changed the face of battle: the Japanese surprise attack at the Battle of the Midway was thwarted by an early warning. Timely information, however, is only the beginning of the surprising and disturbing aspects of decisions that are made in war, where brute force is often more critical.
Intelligence in War is a thought-provoking work that ranks among John Keegan’s finest achievements.
|
| Customer Reviews: Read 41 more reviews...
 Translating Intelligence into Victory, or Not..... February 27, 2008
John Keegan's 2003 "Intelligence in War" is a well-written, if limited, survey of several battle and campaigns to determine what if any impact intelligence had on their outcome. Keegan cites Admiral Lord Nelson's pursuit of Napoleon's fleet, Stonewall Jackson's famous Valley campaign, and the World War II battles of Crete, Midway, and the North Atlantic, among others. His concluding argument seems to be that the availability of good intelligence in and of itself does not determine the outcome of conflict as much as the ability of warriors to turn intelligence into some decisive advantage on the battlefield. As Keegan notes, the outcome of battle may be as much dependent on sheer chance as anything else.
Keegan's book sparked some vigorously dissenting opinions on the value of his argument, as can be seen in other reviews. It has been noted before that Keegan's undoubted powers of description are sometimes stronger than his ability to interpret their meaning. To the extent that Keegan breaks no new intellectual ground in this book, those dissenting opinions are perfectly valid. The effect of "Intelligence in War" to strip away some of the mystique of intelligence in war is likely of value for the general reader, as opposed to the dedicated student of conflict or intelligence. His selected examples place intelligence firmly in context in the chaos that accompanies battle. His point, that intelligence can facilitate success but does not mandate it, may be far less obvious to the general reader than to the dedicated student.
Keegan's prose, as always, is imminently readable. His accounts of the Battle of the North Atlantic and of Crete, including his analysis of the outcomes, are superbly concise, with much nuance. Keegan includes an excellent selection of maps and photographs.
This book is recommended to the general reader looking for a entertaining discussion of just how intelligence can fit into the bigger picture in conflict. Dedicated students of intelligence in warfare will find more challenging fare elsewhere.
 Spys in War November 15, 2007
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
Sir John Keegan, the defense editor for "The Daily Telegraph" and one of the foremost military historians writing in English today, has turned his attention to an important but regularly overlooked topic--the role of military intelligence in combat operations. He argues that political intelligence is an ancient craft that goes back almost as far as recorded history, but military intelligence has until the last 200 hundred years or so had limited impact on the battlefield due to the technological challenges of getting information to a commander and then to units in the field. Intelligence was mainly the work of scouts.
In a series of case studies starting with the naval operations of Lord Nelson, Keegan argues: "Intelligence, however good, is not necessarily the means to victory; that ultimately, it is force, not fraud or forethought, that counts" (p. 334). Two of the most striking examples he uses are the battles of Crete in 1940 and Midway in 1942. At Crete, the British had accurate signals intelligence telling them what the Germans were going to do and they still lost. At Midway, the Americans had equally good information on what the Japanese intended, but random chance was the key to U.S. victory. The American planes that sank three of the four Japanese carriers were lost and found the enemy fleet by accident at a time when their defenses were ill prepared for another attack.
These arguments are important. We use this book at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College where I currently teach. Keegan's ideas are revisionist but also seem straight forward. The title is accurate. This book focuses only on military intelligence in war. The subtitle is a bit misleading. There is next to no mention of al-Qaeda in the book. Keegan is an exceptionally easy read, but he raises some significant questions which is always a good combination.
Keegan's newest October 15, 2007
John Keegan has been writing books like this for years now, and he's built a reputation as the foremost historian in the world at the current time. He tends, for the most part, to write thematic history, rather than narratives, and they tend to have a point rather than recount a series of events. The current book is a study of the uses of intelligence in warfare. Keegan's typical style is to recount a series of episodes, using them to illustrate the various aspects of the subject he's discussing. In this instance he starts with Nelson's epic search for the French fleet in the Med during the 1798 campaign that led to the Battle of the Nile.
From there he works through Jackson in the Valley, Spee in the Pacific at the start of World War I, and then a group of episodes from the Second World War. The episodes work to build Keegan's central thesis, which is that while intelligence is important in warfare, it's not *the* central important feature of warfare that some think it. At times, firepower, overwhelming combat power, even tactical prowess, can cancel superior intelligence, even completely overwhelm it.
Keegan is one of those writers who tries things, not always successfully. Failure or success, he tries interesting things. In this instance, his attempt is mostly successful, more than in the History of Warfare, for instance. His whole point, which I stated above, is well-made, and the episodes he recounts reinforce the central thesis of the book. I enjoyed this book. Frankly I wouldn't recommend it for those who aren't specialists, but I would recommend it for those who are interested in military history or the current struggles with Al Qaeda.
 Some Interesting Thoughts, Some Errors October 11, 2007
John Keegan herein presents six case studies of the effect of intelligence on war, and makes the very good point that intelligence is unable to accomplish anything unless linked to sufficient, well-used force.
This is all very good, but I have to caution potential buyers: I know enough to partially evaluate one chapter, number five on Crete and Enigma. In it, Keegan displays such complete misunderstanding of cryptography that literally nothing he says on the subject can be trusted (he thinks the Caesar cipher, the world's simplest substitution system, is a transposition!). This leaves me wondering if the information I can't evaluate is similarly wrong.
Worth reading, but probably not worth buying new.
A candid study that takes the reader through a compendium of military campaigns. February 6, 2007
11 out of 11 found this review helpful
John Keegan's Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda is a must read, based on case studies, for anyone seriously interested in the relationship of intelligence to war-fighting. Strategic, operational, and tactical manifestations are considered.
*Muslim fundamentalism is profoundly unintellectual; it is, by that token, opposed to everything the West understands by the idea of "intelligence." The challenge to the West's intelligence services is to find a way into the fundamentalist mind and to overcome it from within. P 319.
*The challenge will cast the agencies back onto methods which have come to appear outdated, even primitive, in the age of satellite surveillance and computer decryption ...far superior to any holder of a Ph.D. in higher mathematics ...better adapted to the future world of espionage than any graduate student in regional studies. Pp 317-318.
Distinct by impressive research, this progressive study debunks the myths heralded by modern pundits as to the "fix-all" reliance associated with intelligence, clearly articulates both its uses and limitations, and the nexus between intelligence and its customer/s.
*Results in war, in the last resort, are of body, not mind; of physical force, not plans or intelligence. P 219.
*The outcome of the Atlantic battle, seen in perspective, suggests that intelligence, as in so many other operational circumstances, was, though significant, secondary to the age-old business of fighting the issue out. P 256.
*Allied bombing not only wrought terrible devastation on German homes and factories, and on German's cultural heritage, and terrible disruption as well as termination of ordinary Germans' everyday lives; it also directly attacked Hitler's and his Nazi party's claim to be the protectors of the German people. P 262.
While the majority of case studies are maritime oriented, this is a masterful book that will appeal to students, scholars, policymakers, and lay readers alike. I recommend that it be read in conjunction with Admiral McRaven's SPEC OPS for full effect.
|
|
|
Powered by Associate-O-Matic
| |
